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Several protocols for controlled teleportation were suggested by Yang, Chu, and Han [PRA 70,
022329 (2004)]. In these protocols, Alice teleports qubits (in an unknown state) to Bob iff a controller
allows it. We view this problem in the perspective of secure multi-party quantum computation. We
show that the suggested entanglement-efficient protocols for m-qubit controlled teleportation are
open to cheating; Alice and Bob may teleport (m− 1)-qubits of quantum information, out of the
controllers’ control. We conjecture that the straightforward protocol for controlled teleportation,
which requires each controller to hold m entangled qubits, is optimal. We prove this conjecture for
a limited, but interesting, subset of protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure multi-party quantum computation (MPQC)
protocol [3] allows n players to compute an agreed quan-
tum circuit where each player has access only to his own
arbitrary quantum input. A MPQC protocol has two
phases: In the sharing phase, players dubbed dealers pro-
vide the other players with their initial state. In the re-
construction phase, the honest players help a designated
player reconstruct the final state of the protocol. Dur-
ing the latter phase, only local operations and classical
computation is available.
In this paper we view controlled teleportation as a spe-
cial case of MPQC. A dealer named Carol hands Alice
and Bob an (entangled) initial state |ψABC〉. A second
dealer, named David, provides Alice with an unknown
m-qubit state ρ. The task of Alice and Bob is to recon-
struct (teleport) ρ into Bob’s hands, when Carol allows it.
|ψABC〉 is such that Carol controls whether the teleporta-
tion can take place. Carol and David are honest dealers.
We call a controlled teleportation protocol secure if it is
impossible for malicious Alice and Bob to teleport any
part of ρ before the reconstruction phase. Namely, if Al-
ice and Bob can build a state ρ′ at Bob’s hands which
has non-trivial fidelity with ρ before the reconstruction
phase, the protocol is insecure.
The straightforward solution to this problem, sug-
gested in [7], is to use a procedure described in [4, 5].
First, Carol prepares the following 3m-qubit state and
gives Alice and Bob their respective qubits
⊗mi=1 |GHZ〉ABC(i) =
⊗mi=1
(∣∣φ+〉
AB(i)
|+〉
C(i) +
∣∣φ−〉
AB(i)
|−〉
C(i)
)
. (1)
(Here, and throughout the paper, we drop normaliza-
tion factors for readability), {|ψ±〉 , |φ±〉} are the four
Bell-BMR[2] states, |±〉 = |0〉±|1〉√
2
, and |GHZ〉
ABC(i) =
|000〉+|111〉√
2
is the ith GHZ state shared among Alice, Bob
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and Carol. Later, if Carol wishes to allow the teleporta-
tion, she measures her m qubits in the Hadamard basis,
and publishes her results ci ∈ {+,−}. Now, the state
shared by Alice and Bob is ⊗mi=1 |φ
ci〉 which can be freely
used by them for teleportation.
On the other hand, if Carol abstains from participa-
tion, the state shared by Alice and Bob can be calculated
by tracing over Carol’s qubits
tr C ⊗
m
i=1 |GHZ〉 〈GHZ|ABC(i) =
⊗mi=1
(
|00〉 〈00|
AB(i) + |11〉 〈11|AB(i)
)
. (2)
We note here, that without the participation of Carol,
the state shared by Alice and Bob becomes a classical
correlation, which cannot facilitate quantum teleporta-
tion.
Ref. [7] provides a second protocol, in which Carol
holds only one entangled qubit, aiming at the same task.
This entanglement-efficient protocol can be stated as fol-
lows: Carol creates the following 2(m + 1)-qubit state
and gives Alice and Bob their respective qubits
⊗mi=1
∣∣φ+〉
AB(i)
⊗
∣∣φ+〉
AC
+⊗mi=1
∣∣φ−〉
AB(i)
⊗
∣∣ψ+〉
AC
.(3)
Later, if Carol wishes to allow the teleportation, she mea-
sures her single qubit in the computational basis and
publishes her result. Alice measures her own rightmost
qubit in the computational basis. If it is equal to Carol’s
outcome, then Alice and Bob share ⊗m
i=1 |φ
+〉
AB(i). Oth-
erwise, they share ⊗mi=1 |φ
−〉
AB(i). Either way, they can
safely teleport m qubits. On the other hand, if Carol
abstains from participation, and if Alice and Bob con-
tinue the protocol exactly as planned, they can no longer
teleport Alice’s m-qubit message reliably, since they will
create a mixed state [7, Eq. (11)] instead.
II. ALICE AND BOB CAN CHEAT CAROL
In fact, in the second protocol, even if Carol does not
participate, malicious Alice and Bob can let Alice tele-
port any (m − 1)-qubit state to Bob. The abstention of
Carol mixes the shared state to create
⊗mi=1
∣∣φ+〉 〈φ+∣∣
AB(i)
⊗ 1A +⊗
m
i=1
∣∣φ−〉 〈φ−∣∣
AB(i)
⊗ 1A,(4)
2where 1 is the totally mixed state in one qubit. Yet
Alice and Bob can easily distill it [1]. Each of them has
to relinquish his or her mth qubit and measure it in the
computational basis. If their results coincide, they share
⊗m−1
i=1 |φ
+〉
AB(i); otherwise they share ⊗
m−1
i=1 |φ
−〉
AB(i).
Either way, they can safely teleport any (m − 1)-qubit
state and thus reconstruct any m-qubit state with high
fidelity.
It is important to note that [7] never claimed that Bob
can learn nothing about Alice’s state, and they stated
openly that they did not “attempt a comprehensive study
of the security against all possible forms of eavesdrop-
ping and/or cheating”. However, it is equally important
to note that their efficient protocol for multiqubit quan-
tum information teleportation via the control of an agent,
is insecure. The same malady affects their protocol for
multiple controllers (see Section IV).
III. CAROL NEEDS m ENTANGLED QUBITS
When Carol held a single qubit entangled to Alice and
Bob, she could control only one of their qubits, and not
the rest. We believe that this is not an accident. We
conjecture that Carol must have at least m entangled
qubits with Alice and Bob if she wants to completely
control their ability to teleport an m-qubit state.
We prove a special case of this conjecture. We de-
fine a limited form of secure controlled teleportation.
In the limited form, we assume three additional limi-
tations. (a) The initial state shared by Alice, Bob and
Carol is pure.[8] (b) If Carol abstains, the remaining state
ρAB = tr C |ψABC〉 〈ψABC | is separable.[9] (c) In the re-
construction phase, Carol performs her measurement on
the shared state without obtaining any prior information
from Alice and Bob; Alice and Bob do not help Carol to
assist them.[10]
These limitations are not true in general, since the
initially-shared state may be mixed, since a bound-
entangled state is probably equally unhelpful for Alice
and Bob if they want to perform teleportation, and since
the reconstruction phase can be more complex. Note
that these limitations leave enough room for interesting
protocols. Specifically, the protocols of [7] satisfy limita-
tions (a) and (c), and the ones not satisfying (b) can be
cheated because of that.
Limitation (c) means that the highest value of entan-
glement that Alice and Bob can create between them
with the help of Carol is EoA1(ρAB), the entanglement
of assistance, which in turn is limited by EoA∞(ρAB).
Recently, Smolin, Verstraete, and Winter [6] showed that
EoA∞(ρAB) ≤ min(S(A), S(B)). (5)
Let us now assume that a secure limited controlled
teleportation protocol exists, i.e. there exists |ψABC〉
so that ρAB = tr C |ψABC〉 〈ψABC | is separable, while
EoA1(ρAB) ≥ m. Since ρAB is separable, S(ρAB) ≥
max(S(A), S(B)). We conclude that
S(ρAB)
(b)
≥ max(S(A), S(B))
≥ min(S(A), S(B))
[6]
≥ EoA∞(ρAB) (6)
≥ EoA1(ρAB)
(c)
≥ m.
But since |ψABC〉 is pure, S(ρAB) is exactly the initial en-
tanglement of Carol with Alice and Bob. Thus, a limited
controlled teleportation protocol requires Carol to hold
no less than m entangled bits—just as in the straightfor-
ward protocol.
IV. MULTIPLE CONTROLLERS
In an extended problem presented in [7], Carol is re-
placed by n controllers: If all the controllers participate,
Alice can teleport an m-qubit message to Bob. But even
if a single controller abstains, the teleportation has to be
impossible.
In the straightforward protocol achieving this, the con-
trollers prepare the following (n + 2)m-qubit state and
give each participant his or her respective qubits
⊗mi=1 |GHZ〉ABCn(i) =
⊗mi=1

∣∣φ+〉
AB(i)
H⊗n
∑
even |x|
|x〉
Cn(i)+
∣∣φ−〉
AB(i)
H⊗n
∑
odd |x|
|x〉
Cn(i)

 (7)
where H⊗n is the Hadamard transform on n qubits, and
the summations are over the n-bit strings x whose Ham-
ming weight |x| is even (odd). Later, when all the con-
trollers wish to allow the teleportation, each of them ap-
ply the Hadamard transform to her first qubit, measures
it in the computational basis, and publishes her result.
If the number of “1”s published by all controllers is even
(odd), Alice and Bob share |φ+〉 (|φ−〉). Either way, they
can safely teleport one qubit. This is repeated on the
m− 1 sets of remaining qubits.
On the other hand, if even a single controller abstains,
the complete state becomes a classical correlation, un-
worthy for teleportation.
In this protocol each controller initially holds m en-
tangled bits with the rest of the system. Much like as
in the case of a single controller, the protocol cannot be
improved by another protocol of the limited form.
If all n controllers participate, they can be thought of
as one, and m ≤ EoA(ρAB) ≤ min(S(A), S(B)).
If one of the controllers (C′) abstains, we require
that ρABCn−1 would become separable. Again, this
means that each controller’s entanglement with the
rest of the system S(C′) = S(ρABCn−1) has to be
3more than max(S(A), S(B)) and certainly more than
min(S(A), S(B)) ≥ m.
Any limited controlled teleportation protocol that tries
to be more entanglement-efficient than that, is insecure.
For example, in the shared state suggested in [7, Eq. (21)]
⊗mi=1
∣∣φ+〉
AB(i)
⊗ |GHZ+〉ACn +
⊗mi=1
∣∣φ−〉
AB(i)
⊗ |GHZ−〉ACn (8)
(where |GHZ±〉 = |0...0〉 ± |1...1〉 is an n+ 1 qubit state
share by Alice and the n controllers) there is only one
bit of entanglement between the group of all controllers
and the Alice and Bob pair. Therefore, Alice and Bob
can again ignore the controllers and remain with a state
useful for teleportation.
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